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ULTIMATE FACT RULE
The Demise of the Ultimate Fact Rule in Indiana
In 1915, the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiff in Hamilton, Harris & Co. v. Larrimer,I a negligence action brought
by a pedestrian against an owner and operator of a truck to recover damages
for personal injuries. In particular, the court ruled that there was no error in
excluding the opinion of a lay witness as to the driving capability of the
defendant. Over sixty years later, the Court of Appeals of Indiana reached
the opposite result in Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. McCarrell,2 a case
presenting an analogous fact situation.A The defendant had contended that a
statement made by its foreman prior to trial was inadmissible because the
opinion expressed therein embraced an ultimate issue and, therefore, invaded
the province of the jury.4 Rejecting this argument, the court held that "the
per se exclusion rule has been abrogated, and the trial judge at his discretion,
may in an appropriate case, permit such evidence." s
As both the supreme court and the court of appeals have subsequently
cited the Rieth-Riley rule with approval, 6 it is apparent that Indiana has join-
ed a number of other states in permitting opinions by lay witnesses upon
ultimate fact issues. 7 This note will examine the development of the ultimate
fact rule in Indiana together with its rationale and shortcomings, then will
analyze and evaluate the new rule established by the Rieth-Riley decision.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ULTIMATE FACT RULE
According to Wigmore, the notion that lay opinion testimony was inad-
missible may have grown from the principle of personal observation8 which
1183 Ind. 429, 105 N.E. 43 (1915).
t Ind. App. -, 325 N.E.2d 844 (1975).
3in Rieth-Riley, the plaintiff McCarrell sued a road builder for personal injuries he sus-
tained when the car he was driving collided with a piece of pipe laying on a travelled portion of
the road.4The trial court allowed the plaintiffs attorney to read to the jury the foreman's prior
statement: "Well, I'll reword it in this way then. If I had been driving that automobile and that
pipe had popped in front of me like that there would have been nothing I could have done about
it." 325 N.E.2d at 851.
VId. at 852. To appreciate the significance of this decision, one should note that Indiana
has not codified its law of evidence, remaining a common law jurisdiction in that respect.6See, e.g., Williams v. State, - Ind. -, 352 N.E.2d 733 (1976); Enyart v. Blacketor,
SInd. App. - , 342 N.E.2d 654 (1976); Haskett v. Haskett, - Ind. App. - , 327
N.E.2d 612 (1975).
7See the following cases and codifications: Grismore v. Consolidated Prod. Co., 232 Iowa
528, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942); Drahota v. Weiser, 183 Neb. 66, 157 N.W.2d 857 (1968); Rader v.
Gibbons and Reed Co., 261 Ore. 354, 494 P.2d 412 (1972); Dewing v. Cooper, 33 Wis. 2d 260,
147 N.W.2d 261 (1967); CAL. EVID. CODE § 805 (West 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-456(d)
(1976); N.J. EvID. RuLE 56(3) (1967).
82 WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 657 (3rd ed. 1940).
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demanded that witnesses speak from first-hand knowledge rather than from
the reports of others.9 Although skilled witnesses were permitted to give opin-
ions without personal knowledge, the rule initially allowed lay opinions only
where an adequate factual basis had been established.10 Throughout the mid-
1800's, Indiana cases" followed the rule articulated by the Supreme Court of
Indiana in City of Indianapolis v. Huffer: "The rule is, that any witness, not
an expert, who knows the facts personally, may give an opinion in a matter
requiring skill, stating also the facts upon which he bases the opinion."' 2
Eventually, inadmissibility of opinions not supported by a witness' own
factual knowledge was extended to lay opinions wherever the witness could
adequately present all of the facts to the jury. The Supreme Court of Indiana
drew this curious distinction in Carthage Turnpike Co. v. Andrews.' s First,
it affirmed the "general rule that non-expert witnesses may give their opin-
ions, if they state, as far as possible, the facts and observations upon which
they are based."' 4 However, calling this a "rule of necessity,"' 5 the court
reasoned that "[w]hen the case is one in which all the facts can be presented
to jury, then no opinion can be given, because the jury are as well qualified
as the witness to form a conclusion.'1 The court apparently reasoned that
once all of the facts were given to the jury, the witness' opinion added
nothing and, therefore, was not useful to their deliberations.
After Carthage Turnpike, Indiana courts required the per se exclusion of
such lay opinion evidence.' 7 Nevertheless, numerous exceptions have been
recognized where the witness has some special knowledge as to the subject
97 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1917, at 1-3 (3rd ed. 1940).
"See, e.g., Parker v. State, 136 Ind. 284, 35 N.E. 1105 (1893); City of Terre Haute v.
Hudnut, 112 Ind. 542, 13 N.E. 686 (1887).
"See Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550 (1884); Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464 (1883); Sage v.
State, 91 Ind. 141 (1883); Colee v. State, 75 Ind. 511 (1881); State v. Newlin, 69 Ind. 108
(1879); Coffman v. Reeves, 62 Ind. 108 (1878); Holten v. Board of Comm'rs, 55 Ind. 194 (1876);
Benson v. McFadden, 50 Ind. 431 (1875).
1230 Ind. 235, 237 (1868).
'1102 Ind. 138, 1 N.E. 364 (1885).
141d. at 142, 1 N.E. at 366-67 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 142, 1 N.E. at 367.
"61d. (emphasis added).
"See McKee v. Hasler, 229 Ind. 437, 98 N.E.2d 657 (1951); Sherfey v. Evansville & T.H.
R.R., 121 Ind. 427, 23 N.E. 273 (1889); Albright v. Hughes, 107 Ind. App. 651, 26 N.E.2d 576
(1940); Winski v. Clegg, 81 Ind. App. 560, 142 N.E. 130 (1924); Roper v. Cannel City Oil Co.,
68 Ind. App. 637. 121 N.E. 96 (1918); Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Indiana Reduction Co., 65 Ind.
App. 330. 117 N.E. 273 (1917); Insurance Co. of N. America and Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Osborn,
26 Ind. App. 88, 59 N.E. 181 (1901).
In Hamilton, Harris & Co. v. Larrimer, for example, no special knowledge was
demonstrated, so exclusion resulted. A witness to the accident was asked: "Do you know whether
or not they stopped as quickly as it could be done?" and responded "I should judge so. I think
the young man did very well." The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court correctly sustained
the motion to strike the answer since the witness was merely a bystander "who did not pretend to




matter. These include testimony as to speed,18 space or distance,' 9 hand-
writing,2 0 age,21 bodily appearance or condition,22 quantity or capacity,23 men-
tal condition,24 value,25 and damages.2
6
Eventually, the opinion rule came to be treated as a "somewhat am-
biguous and much relaxed rule of evidence,"27 with admissibility of opinions
being largely within the discretion of the courts.28 Dean McCormick observed
that it "may well be described, not as a rule excluding opinions, but as a rule
of preference. . . . [m]ore concrete description is preferred to the more
"
8See American Motor Car Co. v. Robbins, 181 Ind. 417, 420, 103 N.E. 641, 642 (1913)
(speed of an automobile); Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Hendricks, 128 Ind. 462, 463, 28 N.E. 58,
58 (1891) (speed of a moving train); Garr v. Blissmer, 132 Ind. App. 635, 644, 177 N.E.2d 913,
917 (1961) (speed of an automobile); Rump v. Woods, 50 Ind. App. 347, 356, 98 N.E. 369, 372
(1912) (pre-collision speed of an automobile); Lake Erie & W. Ry. v. Moore, 51 Ind. App. 110,
123, 97 N.E. 203, 208 (1912) (speed of a train).
"
5 See Gibson Coal Co. v. Kriebs, 150 Ind. App. 173, 175, 275 N.E.2d 821, 824 (1971) (the
extent to which a truck protruded into a highway).
5OSee Miller v. Coulter, 156 Ind. 290, 296, 59 N.E. 853, 855 (1901) (witness attesting to gen-
uineness of the testator's signature); Tucker v. Hyatt, 144 Ind. 635, 638, 41 N.E. 1047, 1048
(1895) (witness testifying as to genuineness of the plaintiffs handwriting was competent even
though the witness became acquainted with the handwriting since the opening of the trial); Dun-
can v. Binford, 151 Ind. App. 199, 278 N.E.2d 591, 599 (1972) (genuineness of signature on
receipt card acknowledging service of process).
2'See Benson v. McFadden, 50 Ind. 431, 433 (1875) (age of the defendant pleading infancy
at the time of making the contract sued on).
"
2See Western and S. Life Ins. Co. v. Danciu, 217 Ind. 263, 271-73, 26 N.E.2d 912, 915-16
(1940) (physical condition of a person insured by a life insurance policy); Cleveland, Co., Chi. &
St. L. Ry. v. Gray, 148 Ind. 266, 278, 46 N.E. 675, 678 (1897) (whether the plaintiff appeared
to be sick or not); New York Cent. R.R. v. De Leury, 100 Ind. App. 140, 148-49. 192 N.E. 125,
129 (1934) (mental and physical condition of an accident victim).
"See Romona Oolitic Stone Co. v. Shields, 173 Ind. 68, 72, 88 N.E. 595, 597 (1909)
(capacity of a derrick used for hoisting stone).
24See Sanger v. Bacon, 180 Ind. 322, 329, 101 N.E. 1001, 1003 (1913) (mental condition of
testator); Swygart v. Willard, 166 Ind. 25, 32-33, 76 N.E. 755, 757 (1906) (soundness of testator's
mind); Stumph v. Miller, 142 Ind. 442, 446, 41 N.E. 812, 813 (1895) (feeblemindedness of gran-
tor in a contract for the sale of land); Cline v. Lindsey, 110 Ind. 337, 340-41, 11 N.E. 441,
442-43 (1887) (insanity of testator in a will contest); Guardianship of Carrico v. Bennett, -
Ind. App. -, 319 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1974) (competence of a woman to manage her property);
Norman v. Norman, 131 Ind. App. 67, 83, 169 N.E.2d 414, 421 (1960) (unsoundness of gran-
tor's mind in a quiet title action).
"See Southern Sur. Co. v. Calverly, 195 Ind. 247, 255, 143 N.E. 626, 628 (1924) (value of
municipal bonds); Walker v. Statzer, 152 Ind. App. 544, 551, 284 N.E.2d 127, 131 (1972) (value
of witness' own services); First Bank and Trust Co. v. Tellson, 124 Ind. App. 478, 488, 118
N.E.2d 496, 501 (1954) (value of services); Grave v. Pemberton, 3 Ind. App. 71, 73, 29 N.E.
177, 177-78 (1891) (value of services).
21See Terre Haute & L. R.R. v. Crawford, 100 Ind. 550, 555 (1885) (cost of filling lots);
Charles Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, - Ind. App. - , 357 N.E.2d 247, 252 (1976)
(damages to an automobile); Rogers Cartage Co. v. Peglow, 122 Ind. App. 481, 483-84, 106
N.E.2d 235, 236 (1952) (cost of repairing damages to real estate).
212 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 403, at 750 (5th ed. 1958).
"See Southern Sur. Co. v. Calverly, 195 Ind. 247, 255, 143 N.E. 626, 628 (1924) (no abuse
of discretion was found where the trial court allowed a nonprofessional witness having knowledge
of property and its value to testify to the value of municipal bonds); Frederick v. Sault, 19 Ind.
App. 604, 605-06, 49 N.E. 909, 910 (1898) (no abuse of discretion was found in the trial court
permitting a pianist to testify to the value of a piano).
1977-1978]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
abstract." 29 Nevertheless, Indiana courts remained adamant in enforcing the
opinion rule whenever a witness' testimony concerned an ultimate fact in
issue.3 0
Not until recently, in Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. McCarrell,3 1 was
discretion extended to Indiana trial courts to admit lay opinion testimony
where it concerned an ultimate fact in issue. To gain an understanding and
appreciation of the new rule announced by Rieth-Riley, it is necessary to
analyze the rationale behind the exclusion of opinion testimony concerning an
ultimate fact.
RATIONALE OF THE ULTIMATE FACT RULE
Commentators have called the ultimate fact rule "a proposition, the
validity of which diminishes in proportion to the strictness with which it is ap-
plied."5  Wigmore reasoned that:
The fallacy of this doctrine is, of course, that it is both too narrow and
too broad, measured by the principle. It is too broad, because, even when
the very point in issue is to be spoken to, the jury should have help if it is
needed. It is too narrow, because opinion may be inadmissible when it deals
with something other than the point in issue. Furthermore, the rule if carried
out strictly and invariably would exclude the most necessary testimony.33
Thus, the per se exclusion under the ultimate fact rule leads to the "absurd
result that admissibility varies in inverse proportion to relevancy. '" 3 4
An understanding of the problems associated with the ultimate fact rule
cannot be acquired without a working definition of the term "ultimate fact."
9McCoRmicK's HANDBOOK ON TrHE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 11, at 25 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
3 In effect, an ultimate fact rule was being enforced. See Lamb v. York, 252 Ind. 252, 264,
247 N.E.2d 197, 204-05 (1969) (dangerousness of a piece of farm machinery); Southern Ind.
Power Co. v. Miller, 185 Ind. 35, 37, 111 N.E. 925, 926 (1916) (whether bad well water was
caused by the backing up of a dam); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Green, 164 Ind. 349, 354,
73 N.E. 707, 709 (1905) (the authority of an agent to enter into a contract); Johnson v. Ander-
son, 143 Ind. 493, 494, 42 N.E. 815, 815 (1896) (the public utility of a proposed change in a
highway); Brunker v. Cummins, 133 Ind. 443, 446, 32 N.E. 732, 733 (1892) (whether a person
could walk between a barrel and a building with safety); Azimow v. Azimow, 146 Ind. App. 341,
350, 255 N.E.2d 667, 673 (1970) (whether a couple held themselves out to the community to be
husband and wife); Webb v. Volz, 122 Ind. App. 53, 57, 102 N.E.2d 517, 519 (1951) (the con-
clusion that a certain vehicle was a stolen car); Cleveland, C., Chi. & St. L. Ry. v. Osgood, 36
Ind. App. 34, 43-44, 73 N.E. 285, 288 (1905) (the proper method of handling and positioning
railroad cars).
The phrases "ultimate fact" and "ultimate issue" have been used interchangeably.
"Technically, it makes no difference whether it is an ultimate issue or an ultimate fact on which
the court allows or disallows the witness to testify, since the submission of an issue to the jury
necessarily requires their finding of a fact or a group of facts." Note, Opinion Testimony and
Ultimate Issues: Incompatible?, 51 KY. L.J. 540, 541 (1963).
s Ind. App. -, 325 N.E.2d 844 (1975).
"
2Cowen & Carter, Some Observations on the Opinion Rule, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 164 (Z. Cowen & P. Carter eds. 1956).
337 WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 1921, at 18-19 (3rd ed. 1940).
3416 N.C. L. REV. 180, 183 (1938).
[Vol. 53:365
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The court in Oliver v. Coffman s best articulated the definition, stating that
"[a]n ultimate fact is the final or resultant fact that has been reached, by the
processes of logical reasoning, from the detailed or probative facts."36 Thus,
ultimate facts must be distinguished from evidentiary facts and conclusions of
law. In Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., the court reviewed an Industrial Board
finding and explained that:
Ultimate facts are determined as a result of an inferential process; the
evidentiary facts are the premises and the ultimate facts the conclusions.
Therefore, an ultimate fact may be determined as a result of a natural con-
nection of one fact with others by a process of reasoning. A conclusion of law
differs in that it is made by attaching a rule of law or legal incident to a par-
ticular fact proved. It is the process by which the result is attained which is
determinative of the distinction in the particular case.
3 7
Some examples of ultimate facts include a person's status as employee or in-
dependent contractor;38 the fact "that defendant ran its engine so closely
following a freight train as needlessly to endanger life and property;"39 the
amount of damages for breach of a contract for the sale of land;4 0 a finding,
in a quiet title action, that a party was the owner in fee simple of the
realty; 41 that a bid for a public printing contract was the lowest submitted;42
and the sanity of the defendant in a murder case. 43
The justification often cited in support of the ultimate fact rule has been
that such opinion testimony "usurps the function"44 or is an "invasion of the
province"'4 of the jury.46 Courts in Indiana generally barred opinion evidence
under this theory, using similar language. 47 Despite this apparent support for
the exclusion of lay opinions on ultimate issues of fact, courts and commen-
tators have found the principle to be plagued by four problems: (1) the im-
possibility of drawing meaningful distinctions, (2) undue restrictiveness, (3) il-
logical results, and (4) difficulties in application.
The ultimate fact rule requires the trial court to draw some impossible
31112 Ind. App. 507, 45 N.E.2d 351 (1942).
'Id. at 513, 45 N.E.2d at 354.
1'121 Ind. App. 390, 396-97, 95 N.E.2d 714, 717 (1951).
"SCoppes Bros. & Zook v. Pontius, 76 Ind. App. 298, 301-02, 131 N.E. 845, 846 (1921).
gPennsylvania R.R. v. Hemmer, 206 Ind. 311, 324, 189 N.E. 137, 138 (1934).
4Mortgage Underwriters, Inc. v. Stuckey, 108 Ind. App. 83, 90-91, 27 N.E.2d 111, 114
(1940).
4'Dickason v. Dickason, 219 Ind. 683, 696, 40 N.E.2d 965, 970 (1942).
42Budd v. Board of Comm'rs, 216 Ind. 35, 41, 22 N.E.2d 973, 976 (1939).4SBaum v. State, - Ind. - , 345 N.E.2d 831, 834 (1976).
4'Chicago & A. R.R. v. Springfield & N. R.R., 67 11. 142, 145 (1873).
4
sDeGroot v. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 667, 247 N.W. 69, 73 (1933).
"See, e.g., Norvell, Invasion of the Province of the Juy, 31, TEx. L. REv. 731 (1953);
Note, Opinion Testimony "Invading the Province of the Iury", 20 U. GIN. L. REv. 484 (1951).
47See, e.g, Lamb v. York, 252 Ind. 252, 264, 247 N.E.2d 197, 205 (1969); McKee v.
Hasler, 229 Ind. 437, 468, 98 N.E.2d 657, 670 (1951); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Green,
164 Ind. 349, 354, 73 N.E. 707, 708 (1905).
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distinctions. First, "fact" testimony had to be separated from "opinion"
testimony, a task which Wigmore did not think scientifically possible.4 Nor
was it desirable, from a policy point of view, for a witness to state facts to the
exclusion of opinion:
In many sets of circumstances a witness is in an infinitely better position to
draw an inference than are twelve jurymen. In many cases no amount of
description (which description would itself anyhow be partially based upon
latent inferences) of a complexity of often subconsciously perceived data will
serve to make a jury as well qualified to draw an inference as the witness.4 9
Secondly, the judge had to be careful to admit only those opinions that did
not concern an ultimate fact in issue. The distinction between ultimate and
non-ultimate facts, however, was equally difficult to make. The Supreme
Court of Indiana indicated in De Vaney v. State that this determination is no
easy task:
The first question one must ask is, what is an "ultimate fact in issue"? This is
certainly not clear. There are many definitions found in Black's Law Dic-
tionary, for instance, but they are of little aid. The objective is probably the
desire for concrete details upon the crucial matters in the trial. Although this
goal is meritorious, its consistent application through excluding opinions on
"ultimate facts" approaches impossibility.50
Thus, in theory, ultimate facts may be clearly distinguishable from those
evidentiary facts from which they are inferred,51 but in practice, "the distinc-
tion may be scarcely appreciable. s5 2
Requiring witnesses to state facts rather than opinions ignored the
natural tendency of people not to speak "factually." In other words, most
witnesses cannot testify without reflecting their own conclusions and opinions
in a factual description.5 3 Where such testimony concerned ultimate facts, the
487 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1919, at 14 (3rd ed. 1940).
49Cowen & Carter, Some Observations on the Opinion Rule, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW
EVIDENcE 164 (Z. Cowen & P. Carter eds. 1956).
10259 Ind. 483, 489-90, 288 N.E.2d 732, 736 (1972).
"In DeVaney, a reckless homicide case, the supreme court established an exception to the
ultimate fact rule for expert opinions. On appeal, the defendant contended, inter alia, that it
was error to permit the State's expert witness to testify as to the point of impact of the defen-
dant's and victim's automobiles. He testified that the collision occurred near the outside edge of
the decedent's lane of traffic. This fact was ultimate because it indicated that the defendant's car
had been driven across the center line of the road, supporting the charge of reckless driving.
DeVaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 489, 288 N.E.2d 732, 736 (1972).5tNote, Opinion Testimony and Ultimate Issues: Incompatible?, 51 KY. L.J. 540, 542
(1963).
53As Wigmore observed:
Furthermore, an examination of the so-called Opinion rule, as applied in its
various instances, shows that the opinion-element is, in the very law itself, a merely
superficial and casual mark, and not the essential feature. On the one hand, that
which is excluded is not always "opinion" (in the sense of "inference from observed
[Vol. 53:365
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threat of exclusion either forced the witness to speak unnaturally or jeopardized
an attorney's presentation of the case.
The argument that opinion testimony upon an ultimate issue of fact
usurps the function of the jury is also of questionable validity. The Supreme
Court of Iowa, in the landmark case of Grismore v. Consolidated Products
Co., observed that:
Jurors and witnesses have separate and distinct functions. It is the duty
of the jury to decide issues of fact. A witness could not usurp that function or
invade the province of the jury, by his opinion, if he wished. It may accept it
wholly, or reject it in toto. If the opinion meets with its approval it should
accept it."
4
Since it is a small step from accepting the witness' opinion on an ultimate
fact to finding liability or guilt, the distinction between the functions of
witness and jury are bound to be blurred. As the Grismore court correctly
emphasized, the final determination rests with jury.
The obvious concern expressed by phrases of "usurpation" and "invasion"
is the danger of witnesses stating only their opinions, "not because conclusions
in themselves are necessarily harmful but because the jury cannot ascertain
what happened if it is merely told how to decide the case." 5  Since re-
quirements of relevancy5 6 and personal knowledge, 57 in addition to cross-
examination, are adequate safeguards, the contention that the witness' opin-
ion would "usurp the function of the jury" is at most a makeweight argu-
ment.
Ironically, the ultimate fact rule often deprives the fact-finder of the
most helpful testimony. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine once
remarked:
[T]he reason for its exclusion.., would seem to be a very good reason for its
admission. Instruction is what the jury want. They would not be bound by it,
data" or in any other sense), but may be "fact." For example, where the question is
whether the hair of the accused is black or yellow, or whether a house which the jury
has viewed is three or six stories high, no witness will be listened to, and yet the
testimony excluded deals with "facts," not "opinions," whatever may be the sense taken
for those terms. On the other hand, that which is admitted is not always 'fact," but
often "opinion." For example, all hypothetical estimates of skilled witnesses are to be
so described. Furthermore, for lay witnesses, all matters of measure, identity, quality,
and the like must be considered as no better than "opinions"; and after all, the ques-
tion whether Doe struck Roe first, or vice versa, may become a mere matter of "opin-
ion." In short, the element of inference from observed data is one which plays a great
or less part in every witness' testimony, and yet the rule does not exclude it as such.
7 WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 1919, at 16 (3rd ed. 1940).
54232 Iowa 328, 345-46, 5 N.W.2d 646, 656 (1942).
553 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 704[1], at 704-08 (1975).
"See Lovell v. State, 12 Ind. 18 (1859).
"




any more than by any other testimony, but it would be more or less valuable
in enabling them to come to a correct conclusion."8
Thus, one would reasonably and logically expect that the test for admitting
lay opinions would be "not whether it is on the very issue before the jury, but
whether it will aid the jury under the circumstances of the case." s9
Of course, an opinion could be relevant but unhelpful to the fact-finder;
that is, the jury may be equally capable of reaching the same conclusion.
Herein may lie the only valid justification for exclusion. In City of Bloom-
ington v. Holt, 60 a wrongful death action arising out of an automobile colli-
sion, the State's expert witness6 was permitted to state an opinion as to the
speed of the vehicle, but the trial court refused testimony as to "the role of
the ice." Affirming exclusion of the latter, the Court of Appeals noted:
the trial court apparently determined that when the facts of this case were
placed before the jury, the jury would be as qualified as the expert to deter-
mine whether or not the ice caused the accident. . . .The expert's opinion
about such facts as the speed of the car would surely aid the jury in its deter-
mination of fact. However, we do not feel that the trial court abused its
discretion by deciding that the role of the ice in this accident should be
determined by the jury.62
Finally, the ultimate fact rule creates several problems of application. In
jurisdictions where an exception was carved out to admit expert opinions on
ultimate facts,6 3 the courts were required to distinguish between testimony on
"Snow v. Boston & M. R.R., 65 Me. 230, 231 (1875).
5916 N.C. L. REV. 180, 183 (1938).
60 Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 1211 (1977).
"
1Although Holt involved the admissibility of expert, not lay, opinions, the rulings of the
Court of Appeals are nevertheless instructive on the problem of when an opinion is helpful to the
jury. It is the nature of the opinion, not the witness, that will control admissibility.
61361 N.E.2d at 1218-19.
6
sSee, e.g, Marigold Coal, Inc. v. Thames, 274 Ala. 421, 149 So. 2d 276 (1962); Oxenberg
v. State, 362 P.2d 893 (Alas. 1961); Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Parsons, 80 Ariz. 88, 293 P.2d 430
(1956); Watson v. Southern Pac. Co., 62 Ariz. 29, 152 P.2d 665 (1944); Lee v. Crittenden Coun-
ty, 216 Ark. 480, 226 S.W.2d 79 (1950); Williams v. Cole, 181 Cal. App. 2d 70, 5 Cal. Rptr. 24
(1960); McNelley v. Smith, 149 Colo. 177, 368 P.2d 555 (1962); Diecidue v. State, 119 So. 2d
803 (Fla. 1960); Cozine v. Hawaiian Catamaran, Ltd., 49 Hawaii 77, 412 P.2d 669 (1966);
Hayhurst v. Boyd Hosp., 43 Idaho 661, 254 P.528 (1927); Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 Ill. 2d 514,
211 N.E.2d 733 (1965); DeVaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732 (1972); Tovey v.
Geiser, 150 Kan. 149, 92 P.2d 3 (1939); Shivers v. Caraggio, 223 Md. 585, 165 A.2d 898
(1960); In re Powers' Estate, 375 Mich. 150, 134 N.W.2d 148 (1965); Piche v. Halvorson, 272
N.W. 591 (Minn. 1937); Eickmann v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 651, 253 S.W.2d 122
(1952); Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 P. 326 (1919); Dovey v. Sheridan, 189
Neb. 133, 201 N.W.2d 245 (1972); Lightenburger v. Gordon, 81 Nev. 553, 407 P.2d 728 (1965);
Tobeck v. United Nuclear-Homestake Partners, 85 N.M. 431, 512 P.2d 1267 (1973); General Ac-
cident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Krieghbaum, 46 App. Div. 2d 713, 360 N.Y.S.2d 310
(1974); Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Serv., 234 N.C. 79, 66 S.E.2d 312 (1951); Shepherd v. Midland
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156 (1949); Federal Oil & Gas Co. v. Campbell,
65 Okla. 49, 183 P. 894 (1917); Welter v. M & M Woodworking Co., 216 Ore. 266, 338 P.2d
651 (1959); First Methodist Episcopal Church v. Bangor Gas Co., 7 Pa. D. & C. 730 (1956),
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ultimate facts and testimony on an issue of law, only the former being ad-
missible. 64 Consequently, where a mixed question of law and fact was
presented, problems arose as to whether the opinion stated a factual finding
or a legal conclusion.65
A second application problem posed by the ultimate fact rule was noted
by the court in Rieth-Riley. The principle of strict exclusion was "subject to
misapplication in that it is easily confused with the generally accepted rule
that expert opinion should not be heard on commonplace matters." 66 This
problem arose in Rosenbalm v. Winski,6 7 a wrongful death action brought
by the widow of a fireman who was killed when his firetruck collided at an
intersection with the defendant's automobile. The Court of Appeals cited the
De Vaney rule68 to permit the police officer's opinion on the pre-impact speed
of the firetruck, but found it could not support the officer's opinion that it
was unsafe for the firetruck to proceed into the intersection. The court ex-
plained:
Where the question posed to the expert injects as an element necessary to the
answer, the issue of whether a party was negligent or exercising reasonable
care, the question becomes objectionable because in the eyes of the law or-
dinary men and women are capable of making that assessment based upon
their common knowledge and experience. In such instances the holding in
DeVaney is not at issue. 69
In Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. McCarrell,70 the Court of Appeals
sought to relieve Indiana trial courts of the problems inherent in the ultimate
fact rule by giving them discretion to permit lay testimony on ultimate facts.
For guidance, the court announced a formula to be followed in exercising
affd, 288 Pa. 115, 130 A.2d 517 (1957); State v. Kozukonis, 100 R.I. 298, 214 A.2d 893 (1965);
O'Kelley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 109, 14 S.E.2d 582 (1941); Crowe v. Provost, 52
Tenn. App. 397, 374 S.W.2d 645 (1963); Welch v. Shaver, 351 S.W.2d 588 (1961) and see
generally Norvell, Invasion of the Province of the Jury, 31 TEx. L. REV. 731 (1953); Day v.
Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965); Gerberg v. Crosby, 52 Wash.
2d 792, 329 P.2d 184 (1958); Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963); Kreyer
v. Farmers' Coop. Lumber Co., 18 Wis. 2d 67, 17 N.W.2d 646 (1962); Krahn v. Pierce, 485
P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1971).
"4For an excellent discussion of the functions of court and jury in negligence cases where
there are mixed questions of law and fact, see Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Spencer, 98 Ind.
186, 188-92 (1884).
"sSee Grismore v. Consolidated Prod. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 361, 5 N.W.2d 646, 663 (1942)
for a discussion of proper subjects for opinion testimony. For examples of mixed questions of law
and fact, see Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends and a Note of Caution, 41
DEN. L.C.J. 226, 236-37 (1964).
66325 N.E.2d at 852. For articulation of the rule barring expert opinions on commonplace
matters, see Indiana B. & W. Ry. v. Hale, 93 Ind. 79, 82-83 (1883).
.__ Ind. App. - , 332 N.E.2d 249 (1975).
68In DeVaney v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that expert opinions on ultimate
facts were admissible. 259 Ind. 483, 490, 288 N.E.2d 732, 737 (1972).
69332 N.E.2d 249, 254 (1975).
70__ Ind. App. -, 325 N.E.2d 844 (1975).
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such discretion. In measuring the success of the Rieth-Riey decision, an ex-
amination of that standard is necessary.
EVALUATION OF THE Rieth-Riley RULE
Now that Indiana courts have adopted the modem philosophy that
"provided all other admissibility requirements are met, an opinion upon an
ultimate fact can be given," 71 a question immediately arises as to the stan-
dard to be observed in administering the rule. In Rieth-Riley, the court of
appeals said:
Thus, the per se exclusion rule has been abrogated, and the trial judge
at his discretion, may in an appropriate case, permit such evidence. In exer-
cising his discretion, the trial judge should consider the nature of the issue
and the offered opinion in light of all the attendant circumstances of the par-
ticular case. This court will review such an exercise in judicial discretion only
for an abuse thereof.7 2
A careful reading leads one to conclude that the trial judge is given unfet-
tered discretion under the Rieth-Riley rule because the guidelines established
by the court are uninformative; no indication is given as to when a case
becomes "appropriate" for permitting lay opinion evidence on ultimate facts,
nor is any explanation provided for applying the "nature of the issue" for-
mula in such a case. Accordingly, one must wonder if the formula provides
any real guidance for trial courts faced with the problem of admitting lay
opinions on ultimate facts.
The starting point for answering this vexing question is found in the
Rieth-Riley opinion. Expressing its dissatisfaction with the old ultimate fact
rule, the court of appeals indicated the rationale underlying admissibility:
The strict approach, in our opinion, is unduly restrictive in that it would
operate so as to deprive the trier of fact of useful information in situations
where opinion testimony on an ultimate fact in issue would be the most
desirable or perhaps the only vehicle for relating a particular happening or
fact.1s
Therefore, two considerations are to be taken into account when examining
the "nature of the issue and the offered opinion in light of all the attendant
circumstances of the particular case." First, courts should permit opinion
testimony on ultimate facts so long as it is useful to the determinations of the
fact-finder. Although this might suggest an extra step of preliminarily screen-
ing witnesses to determine the usefulness of their testimony, the cases indicate
71325 N.E.2d at 852.
2Id. at 852-53 (emphasis added).
"Rieth-Riley, for example, the opinion of the foreman was preferable to a factual
description of the movements of the defendant's automobile and the pipe which it struck.
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that, in practice, rulings on admissibility generally take place when objections
are made to the questioning or the responses of witnesses74 or to the introduc-
tion of their out-of-court statements.
7
6
Usefulness or helpfulness are concepts best defined by example. The out-
of-court statement admitted by the trial court in Rieth-Riley was helpful
because as an eyewitness, the foreman was better situated than the jury to
perceive the events and conclude whether or not the accident could have been
avoided. Likewise, in Enyart v. Blacketor, 7 6 a personal injuries action arising
out of a bicycle-automobile collision, the defendant driver was permitted to
express the opinion that he did not have time to avoid the accident. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
because the opinion "served only to inform the jury of Blacketor's perception
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the collision, '77 rather than
tell the jury how to decide the issue. 78
Conversely, lay opinions on ultimate facts should be excluded where they
fail to aid fact-finding. Perhaps McCormick best explained the rationale for
doing so:
Undoubtedly there is a kind of statement by the witness which amounts to no
more than an expression of his general belief as to how the case should be
decided or as to the amount of unliquidated damages which should be given.
It is believed all courts would exclude such extreme expressions. There is no
necessity for this kind of evidence; to receive it would tend to suggest that the
judge and jury may shift responsibility for decision to the witnesses; and in
any event it is wholly without value to the trier of fact in reaching a deci-
sion. 79
In Hunter v. State,80 a married couple was charged with three counts of child
abuse. The Supreme Court held that Bellamy, a defense witness, was properly
precluded from answering two questions since they called for a conclusion on
the exact issue before the jury. The phrasing of the questions virtually copied
the wording of Indiana Code § 35-14-1-2 (1976), asking whether Bellamy had
.ever seen the defendants willfully inflict "unnecessarily severe corporeal
punishment"81 or "torment, vex or afflict"8 2 their adopted son. Rather than
elicit a description of instances of physical or mental abuse, these questions
"See Hunter v. State, - Ind. -, 360 N.E.2d 588 (1977); Bell v. State, - Ind.
-, 366 N.E.2d 1156 (1977); Williams v. State, - Ind. - , 352 N.E.2d 733 (1976);
Enyart v. Blacketor, - Ind. App. - , 342 N.E.2d 654 (1976).
75See Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. McCarrell, - Ind. App. -, 325 N.E.2d 844 (1975).
7.. Ind. App. - , 342 N.E.2d 654 (1976).
7342 N.E.2d at 661.
"The trial court did, however, give a cautionary instruction to the jury to consider the
defendant's interest while weighing his testimony. 342 N.E.2d at 661.
"MCCORMIcK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 12, at 26-27 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
.._ Ind. - , 360 N.E.2d 588 (1977).




required the witness to decide what was "unnecessarily severe" and what con-
stituted "tormenting." Such determinations were to be made by the jury after
considering all the evidence.
The second reason given by the court in Rieth-Riley for permitting lay
opinions on ultimate facts is the desirability or necessity of such evidence. Ap-
parently, the court recognized that witnesses are not always capable of ex-
pressing themselves factually. As long as the opinion is based upon personal
observation, the inability of the witness to state "cold facts" from which the
jury can infer the ultimate fact may be overlooked. As McCormick observed,
courts actually enforce a "rule of preference;"8 3 thus, lay opinions upon
ultimate facts, where necessary, should be admitted.
Although the Court of Appeals did not explicitly state any limitations
upon the rule announced in Rieth-Riley, one should heed the warning that
the "abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit
all opinions."'8' Traditional requirements and limitations still operate to pre-
vent the wholesale admission of lay opinions. First, the opinion must be based
upon facts within the personal knowledge and observation of the witness. For
example, in Bell v. State,85 where the defendant was convicted of the second-
degree murder of his wife, the State's objection was sustained. On cross-
examination, defense counsel asked the only witness to the shooting what she
meant by the statement that the gun "just went off."8 6 When she replied that
the shooting was a tragic accident, an objection was raised, and the trial
court struck the answer on the ground that it invaded the province of the
jury. The Indiana Supreme Court agreed that this was an improper conclu-
sion since the witness had already testified "that she was not sure exactly what
happened." 87 Thus, the opinion that the shooting was a tragic accident could
not have been based upon facts within her knowledge. On the other hand, in
another second-degree murder case, the supreme court ruled that the proper
foundation had been laid for the opinions of the two police officers regarding
the sanity of the defendant because both witnesses had met the minimum re-
quirement of having seen and spoken upon one occasion with the defen-
dant. 88
Nor will opinions upon issues of law be permitted. These are to be decid-
ed by the trial court. Although one may hope that courts will not mistake
ultimate facts with questions of law, some degree of confusion is likely to ex-
ist. This may occur, for example, when a witness testifies that a party was
negligent, criminally responsible, or lacked capacity to make a will.89 To
8SMcCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 11, at 25 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
4 FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 83 (West 1975)
(Advisory Committee Note to Rule 704).
ss Ind. - , 366 N.E.2d 1156 (1977).
861d. at 1158.
31d. at 1159.
"SBaum v. State, - Ind. - 345 N.E.2d 831 (1976).
"
9See Grismore v. Consolidated Prod. Co., 252 Iowa 328, 361, 5 N.W.Pd 646, 665 (1942).
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avoid labeling opinions on the law as opinions on ultimate facts, one author
has suggested that in borderline situations, the witness should be required to
define his terms so that his opinion is not taken by the jury as a statement of
the law.90
Finally, opinions that are unduly prejudicial to the opponent should be
excluded. This was a concern in Enyart v. Blacketor,91 where the defendant's
opinion that there was nothing he could do to avoid the accident was poten-
tially prejudicial. However, the court of appeals refused to find an abuse of
discretion because the trial court's instruction to the jury to consider the in-
terest of the witness in the litigation in weighing his testimony made it unlike-
ly that the opinion would be misused or accorded undue weight.9 2
The Balancing Process
The Indiana cases that have been reported since the Rieth-Riley decision
give some meaning to the elusive formula of considering "the nature of the
issue and the offered opinion in light of all the attendant circumstances of
the particular case." The exercise of discretion seems to involve a balancing
process. In the criminal cases, the nature of the issue has been given sustan-
tial weight, possibly due to the high standard of proof required and the
seriousness of the consequences. In Strickland v. State,93 a first-degree murder
case, the witness was asked to express an opinion as to whether the defendant
harbored any malice toward the victim. The Supreme Court upheld the
State's objection because the question sought a conclusion as to the defen-
dant's state of mind. Citing Clay v. State9' and Gayer v. State,95 the court
noted that psychological facts are to be determined by the jury. However, in
Williams v. State,98 another first-degree murder case, the Supreme Court ap-
proved the questioning of lay witnesses upon issues relating to the insanity
defense. Such testimony was held proper under the authority of Blake v.
State.97 Putting Strickland and Williams together, it is apparent that the
"nature of the issue" part of the Rieth-Riley formula alone can be control-
ling. In Williams, the testimony involved the recounting of observable
behavior, together with the witness' impressions of that conduct. A malice in-
quiry, however, is far more speculative and may require the witness to take a
trip through the mind of the defendant.
9°Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends and a Note of Caution, 41 DEN.
L.C.J. 226, 238 (1964).
91 Ind. App. _ , 342 N.E2d 654 (1976).
92342 N.E. at 661.
9 Ind. - , 359 N.E.2d 244 (1977).
t. Ind. - , 346 N.E.2d 574 (1976).
11247 Ind. 113, 210 N.E.2d 852 (1965).
'_ Ind. - , 352 N.E.2d 733 (1976).
I!-- Ind. -, 323 N.E.2d 227 (1975).
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The "nature of the offered opinion" and "attendant circumstances of the
particular case" portions of the formula involve balancing the considerations
of usefulness and necessity, personal knowledge, and prejudice. In Enyart v.
Blacketor,98 the Court of Appeals performed this task, noting that a factual
basis for the opinion had already been established, that the opinion "served
only to inform the jury of Blacketor's perception of the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the collision," 99 and that the court's instruction to
the jury made misuse of the opinion unlikely. This type of explicit balancing
should serve as the model for all decisions on the admissibility of lay opinions
on ultimate facts. Instead, the courts have remained cryptic, by either retain-
ing the language of the invalid ultimate fact rule in cases of exclusion 00 or by
paying lip-service to the Rieth-Riley rule in cases of admission.' 0' If Indiana
judges and trial lawyers are to derive any benefit from the reported cases, the
opinions must give a clearer explanation of the rulings. Perhaps the strength
of the Rieth-Riley balancing formula lies in its flexibility, but unless better
instruction on its application is given, some doubt as to its workability may be
justified.
CONCLUSION
The demise of the ultimate fact rule will probably not have any alarming
consequences. Litigating parties and interested witnesses may be tempted to
make more self-serving statements in the guise of opinions than would be
possible if they were limited to factual statements. However, cross-
examination and cautionary instructions to the jury should minimize the
danger. Moreover, it is unlikely that any increase in the admissibility of lay
opinion testimony will seriously decrease the use of expert witnesses. The
Rieth-Riley decision did not make lay witnesses any more competent to testify
upon matters requiring special skill or training.
The Rieth-Riley rule, on the other hand, should yield a number of
benefits. When testifying upon ultimate facts issues, lay witnesses will not be
forced to make the choice of speaking "factually" or not at all. Rather than
attempting highly detailed descriptions which they may be incapable of ver-
balizing, witnesses will be able to speak on their own terms.
9$See note 91 supra.
91342 N.E.2d at 661.
'See Bell v, State, - Ind. - , 366 N.E.2d 1156, 1159 (1977) ("A witness will not be
allowed to express a conclusion as to the ultimate question to be decided by the jury."); Hunter
v. State, - Ind. - , 360 N.E.2d 588, 600 (1977) ("[A] witness will not be allowed to express
a conclusion on the ultimate question to be decided by the jury."); Strickland v. State, - Ind.
__ 359 N.E.2d 244, 248 (1977) ("[H]e would be expressing an opinion as to an ultimate fact
of malice, strictly within the province of the jury to determine from all the evidence.").
'I"See Bobbitt v. State, __ Ind. - 361 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (1977) ("The admission of
opinion testimony on an ultimate fact issue is within the discretion of the trial court."); Williams
v. State, - Ind. -, 352 N.E.2d 733, 742 (1976) ("The admissibility of lay witness opinion
testimony on ultimate fact issues is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.").
[Vol. 53:365
ULTIMATE FACT RULE
More importantly, the jury will receive the full benefit of the witness'
observations. While abolishing the rule of per se exclusion of lay opinions on
ultimate facts, Rieth-Riley has provided a far more flexible rule than the rule
of Carthage Turnpike Co. v. Andrews,10 2 where opinion testimony is per-
mitted unless the witness can relate all of the facts upon which the opinion is
based. The "nature of the issue" formula, if properly applied, will result in
supplying jurors with a view of the matter from those persons who were best
situated to perceive the facts and draw inferences therefrom. One commen-
tator has expressed his belief that "the change in attitude toward opinion
evidence indicates increased confidence in the capacity of jurors to under-
stand and evaluate it. It also implies greater regard for the ability and integri-
ty of opinion witnesses."' 0 3
Finally, the Rieth-Riley rule should promote greater judicial efficiency
and increase the probability of fair trials. Arguments over the definition of an
ultimate fact, a useless exercise in semantics, will hardly be missed. Trial
courts will be relieved of the task of evading an illogical exclusionary princi-
ple in an effort to present the jury with helpful and probative evidence. In-
stead, vesting judges with broad discretion expresses confidence in their abili-
ty to recognize the problems inherent in opinion testimony as well as their
awareness of the jury's need for maximum aid in reaching their conclusions.
Of course, the Rieth-Riley formula is not without problems. Considering
the "nature of the issue and the offered opinion in light of the attendant cir-
cumstances of the particular case" is an elusive mandate. Some of the confu-
sion surrounding the formula is merely a reflection of its infancy. For exam-
ple, the weight to be given to the nature of the issue in a civil action will re-
main a mystery until an instance of exclusion of an opinion is reported. Fur-
thermore, the cases to date indicate a need for better articulation of the
reasoning supporting the various decisions. If the Rieth-Riley formula is to
have any independent vitality, the reviewing courts must explain the balanc-
ing process. Unless trial courts and lawyers are so instructed, the potential
benefits of abolishing the rule of per se exclusion may not be realized and the
Rieth-Riley formula will forever remain obscure.
EDWARD J. LIPTAK
102102 Ind. 138, 1 N.E. 364 (1885).
1°1McCormick, Opinion Eidence in Iowa, 19 DRAKE L. REv. 245, 274 (1970).
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